Articles Posted in Russia Sanctions

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In May 2025, the UK government published the Cross-Government Review of Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement policy paper (“Cross-Government Review”). Led by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and supported by key sanctions departments and agencies across the UK government, the Cross-Government Review identifies steps to improve and facilitate compliance with sanctions, increase the deterrent effect of enforcement, and strengthen the government’s enforcement toolkit.

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On October 22, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced significant new sanctions for Russia’s energy sector, designating Rosneft Oil Company (Rosneft) and Lukoil OAO (Lukoil) under Executive Order (EO) 14024 as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), along with dozens of directly named subsidiaries.

These designations prohibit transactions with and services related to Rosneft, Lukoil, any entity that they or other SDNs own 50 percent or more, or any property in which such entities have an interest, directly or indirectly, for U.S. persons and where U.S. primary sanctions jurisdiction otherwise applies.

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On August 6, 2025, President Trump published a new Executive Order imposing secondary tariffs on India in response to its continued importation of Russian-origin crude oil. This marks both an escalation in U.S. trade negotiations with India and the first major Russia-related enforcement action of his second term. It also reflects the Trump Administration’s novel use of trade measures to enforce U.S. sanctions policy.

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On February 24, 2025, the EU adopted its 16th package of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, symbolically marking the third anniversary of the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and constituting the largest set of updates that we have seen in the past two years. On the same day, the UK also issued new designations under its Russia sanctions regime impacting 107 entities, individuals and ships. See a summary of the updates below.

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On December 16, 2024, the EU issued its 15th package of sanctions against Russia, new designations under the Belarus sanctions regime, and the first designations under the hybrid threats sanctions regime adopted in October 2024. These updates are summarized below.

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On September 23, 2024, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released for public inspection a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that seeks to prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles (CVs) with certain hardware and software that have a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia. If the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) hardware and the VCS and Automated Driving System (ADS) software are designed, developed, manufactured or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC or Russia, the transactions outlined below would be prohibited.

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On September 12, 2024, the UK government published the Trade, Aircraft and Shipping Sanctions (Civil Enforcement) Regulations 2024 (the “Regulations”), granting the UK’s trade sanctions enforcement body, the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI), new implementation and enforcement powers effective from 10 October 2024. The Regulations also grant the Department for Transport (DfT) corresponding powers in relation to aircraft and shipping sanctions (i.e., sanctions relating to the movement, registration and ownership of aircrafts and ships).

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On 24 June 2024, the EU adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia. The latest measures include:

  • The designation of 116 additional individuals and entities across a number of industries for their responsibility in undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.
  • A limited ban on contracts with Russian state energy companies and additional support for countries with energy needs to curb reliance on Russia.
  • Anti-circumvention measures, including requirements for EU parent companies to use “best efforts” to ensure that non-EU subsidiaries do not undermine EU sanctions.
  • A ban on the use of “System for Transfer of Financial Messages” (SPFS) (a Russian equivalent of SWIFT) by EU entities operating outside of Russia and a new power for the EU to designate third-country users of SPFS outside of Russia, which will then be subject to a transaction ban.
  • Comprehensive bans on port access by vessels contributing to Russian warfare, non-scheduled flights by controlled by Russian entities, and road transport of goods with 25% or more Russian ownership.
  • An amendment to the existing import-related restrictions concerning Russian diamonds.
  • Further import and export controls impacting Russia’s military-industrial complex and cultural property goods from Ukraine.
  • A requirement for the rejection of intellectual property rights applied for by Russian residents, nationals or entities.
  • A prohibition on accepting funding from the Russian state and its proxies by EU political parties, foundations, NGOs and media service providers.
  • An exemption to the ban on providing software services to Russia in cases where entities are controlled by an EU parent company and other select regions or services are provided by employees who were hired prior to February 2022.
  • A requirement for enhanced reporting, confidentiality requirements, and the promotion of voluntary self-disclosures.
  • Measures to allow EU operators to claim compensation in EU commercial and civil courts for damages caused by Russian companies further to sanctions.

These measures are summarized in further detail below.

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Takeaways

  • Sanctions operate prospectively and do not affect payment obligations to a non-sanctioned party accruing before sanctions became effective.
  • Payment obligations under standby letters of credit at issue were autonomous and unconnected with the underlying transaction.
  • The fulfilment of an independent obligation owed by a German bank to Irish-incorporated aircraft lessors was found not to have intended to benefit the Russian entities involved in other elements of the transaction.

The English Court recently confirmed that sanctions do not excuse non-payment to a non-sanctioned party where the aircraft lease arrangements and related letters of credit were created before sanctions came into effect: Celestial Aviation Services Limited, Constitution Aircraft Leasing (Ireland) 3 Limited and another v UniCredit Bank AG (London Branch) [2023] EWHC 663 (Comm).

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On February 24, 2023, the one-year anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States released extensive new measures designed to impose additional sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. These new measures are summarized below.

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