On November 2, 2022, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce Thea Rozman Kendler answered questions on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) October 13 interim final rule (“the Rule”) regarding restrictions on certain advanced computing integrated circuits and semiconducting manufacturing items exported to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Pillsbury has described the Rule here. Comments on the Rule will be accepted until January 31, 2023. (Previously, comments were accepted until December 12, 2022. This date was extended on December 7, 2022.)
On October 28, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued guidance on its October 7, 2022 interim final rule (Rule) that imposed new export controls on certain advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and semiconductor manufacturing items exported to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Comments on the Rule will be accepted until December 12, 2022. Our previous blog post on the Rule may be found here.
The guidance offers several important clarifications, including regarding the definition of a covered “facility,” the impact of the Rule on deemed exports, and the scope of the “activities of U.S. persons” restrictions. An overview may be found below.
On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (the “Rule”) imposing sweeping new export controls targeting certain advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items intended for the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
- The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) went into effect on June 21, 2022, and requires the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to presume that all goods manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR, or by the entities identified by the U.S. government on June 17, 2022, are made with forced labor and banned from import to the United States, unless the importer demonstrates otherwise (a “rebuttable presumption”).
- Guidance and Reports published in the week leading up to June 21 identify key information for companies seeking to comply with the law, maintain U.S. imports, and understand the supply chain information that may be required by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
- Where the presumption of forced labor applies, rebutting it will require an importer to overcome a high bar by providing “clear and convincing” evidence; however, this same high standard will not necessarily apply to demonstrating that imports have no connection with the XUAR.
On June 12, 2022, a bipartisan group of Senate and House lawmakers announced agreement on a new draft of the National Critical Capabilities Defense Act of 2022 (NCCDA), which would establish an expansive outbound review mechanism for investments and other transactions in specified countries of concern, including China. The draft is based on a bill introduced in the Senate last year that ultimately was not included in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), which passed, while the House included a similar measure in its America COMPETES Act, which also passed, and the two bills are now in conference.
On January 24, 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on behalf of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) issued a Notice Seeking Public Comments on Methods to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, into the United States (RFC). The notice is available here. Comments are due by March 10, 2022.
As part of its continuing efforts to protect US communications networks from communications equipment and services that pose a national security risk, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on June 17, 2021, released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry (NPRM/NOI) seeking comments on its proposal to prohibit the authorization (and revoke existing authorizations) of any communications equipment on the list of equipment and services that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (referred to as the Covered List). The NPRM/NOI also proposes to require entities participating in competitive bidding for FCC licenses to certify that its bids do not rely on financial support from any entity the FCC has designated as a national security threat to the integrity of communications networks or the communications supply chain. Continue reading →
On January 13, 2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a withhold-release order (WRO) on all cotton and tomato products from China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) based on information that reasonably indicated that such products used forced labor. This action comes after CBP’s December 2020 WRO on cotton and cotton products produced by Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation (XPCC). Continue reading →
On January 19, 2021, the Commerce Department issued an interim final rule to implement the Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (E.O. 13873), which was issued on May 15, 2019. The interim rule comes after the November 2019 proposed rule implementing E.O. 13873.