Taiwan Prosecutors Announce First Major Semiconductor Indictments under New National Security Framework

On December 2, 2025, the Taiwan’s High Prosecutor’s Office announced criminal indictments against a subsidiary of Japanese company Tokyo Electron (TEL) and several associated individuals for alleged theft of advanced Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) process technology. This case marks the first significant corporate indictment under Taiwan’s updated national-security framework, which is based in part on the U.S. Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 and 1832), and comes as the U.S. continues apace with its criminal enforcement of export control and trade secret statute violations.

Taiwan Actions
Prosecutors in the TEL case brought charges under both the Taiwan Trade Secrets Act and the National Security Act, the latter of which was amended in 2022 to protect designated “national core critical technologies.” On November 27, 2025, authorities also disclosed a separate investigation involving a former TSMC engineer who later joined Intel, a major TSMC competitor and global customer.

Earlier Taiwan cases, including the 2020 prosecution of Taiwanese company United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC) and three of its employees for leaking trade secrets to PRC chip manufacturer Fujian Jinhua, were brought solely under the Trade Secrets Act and did not invoke national-security provisions.

Recent Taiwanese actions indicate a broader shift toward treating cutting-edge semiconductor know-how as a national-security asset rather than conventional intellectual property. The new indictments also highlight an increasing willingness to address alleged technology leakage within Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem through criminal enforcement that targets not only competitors, but also key suppliers and customers of Taiwanese firms.

The U.S. Enforcement Environment
The cases in Taiwan echo semiconductor technology-related prosecutions in the U.S., and several recent U.S. enforcement trends provide useful context.

UMC and Fujian Jinhua were also charged in the U.S. under the Economic Espionage Act. UMC ultimately pleaded guilty in the case, United States v. United Microelectronics Corp., No. 3:18-cr-00465-MMC (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018), in 2020, while Fujian Jinhua was acquitted in early 2024 after a bench trial.

The U.S. has recently pursued additional cases involving alleged unlawful acquisition or diversion of advanced semiconductor hardware. DOJ has emphasized that preventing the flow of advanced chips and Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) to China is crucial for hampering the PRC’s use of AI for military modernization efforts and advanced surveillance. On December 8, 2025, DOJ announced an indictment relating to unauthorized shipments of NVIDIA H100 and H200 GPUs. This most recent case was brought under the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and focused on concealment of end users and evasion of licensing requirements. Similarly, the DOJ announced the indictment on November 20, 2025 of two U.S. citizens and two PRC nationals for conspiring to export NVIDIA A100, H100, and H200 GPUs to the PRC.

U.S. export-control policy concerning high-performance GPUs remains fluid. Shortly after DOJ announced the H100 and H200 indictments above, President Trump announced that licensed exports of H100 and H200 chips to the PRC would be allowed. Given DOJ’s focus on securing sensitive U.S. technology from illicit Chinese procurement in 2025, one should not expect DOJ to relax its strict enforcement approach for unlicensed, illicit diversion activity, especially where sensitive hardware appears destined for restricted end users or jurisdictions.

Both the U.S. and Taiwan now frame semiconductor protection as a national-security issue, and both are expanding enforcement beyond end users to the intermediaries that enable access or movement of advanced technology.

Key Compliance Considerations

• Companies integrated into semiconductor value chains should maintain strict internal controls and data-protection protocols around sensitive manufacturing information.
• Internal controls should include robust employee on- and off-boarding procedures.
• Companies, regardless of where they are located, should ensure and maintain close coordination between trade-secret protection and export-control compliance functions.

Conclusion
Taiwan’s first major indictment under its updated national-security technology laws aligns with a broader international trend in which advanced semiconductor technology is treated as a strategic, national security resource. As Taiwan and the United States increase scrutiny of individuals and entities throughout the global semiconductor supply chain, firms operating in, or in proximity to, the semiconductor sector should anticipate heightened regulatory scrutiny and ensure their compliance programs reflect the evolving enforcement landscape.