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On January 20, 2025, Donald J. Trump was inaugurated as the 47th President of the United States. Within hours of taking office, President Trump issued dozens of executive orders and an “America First Trade Policy” memorandum outlining his administration’s trade priorities and signaling an aggressive approach to reshaping U.S. trade, sanctions and national security policies. However, “Day 1” tariffs did not materialize despite previous announcements by President Trump that China, Canada and Mexico would be targeted. President Trump has informally suggested that 25% tariffs for Mexico and Canada and an additional 10% tariff for China remain possible by February 1, 2025.

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On January 13, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR), establishing new export controls targeting advanced artificial intelligence (AI) chips and model weights for advanced AI models to protect against national security risks associated with AI while promoting American AI technological leadership. This framework is a tailored strategic initiative designed to regulate the spread of advanced AI models and prevent their access by malicious actors. It enables “secure and responsible foreign entities and destinations” to utilize leading U.S. AI models and the powerful IC clusters needed for their training. Entities that do not comply with established safety and security protocols will not be granted access.

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On January 15, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule (IFR) updating export controls on advanced computing semiconductors. This IFR seeks to ensure that customers of “front-end fabricators” and Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) companies cannot evade controls on advanced computing ICs by misrepresenting the performance capabilities of their integrated circuit (IC) designs.

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On January 16, 2025, the European Commission issued a recommendation encouraging EU Member States to begin reviewing outbound investments in critical technologies including AI, semiconductors and quantum technologies to assess whether such transactions pose risks to EU economic security (the “Recommendation”). The Recommendation constitutes a call for Member States to establish or adapt existing investment screening mechanisms in consultation with relevant stakeholders. The  underlying objectives of the Recommendation are to: (i) ensure the protection of home-grown EU technologies that could bolster military or intelligence capabilities of adversarial states; and (ii) foster a fact-based understanding of the risks posed by outbound investments.

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Earlier this week, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was previously signed on October 9, 2024, formalizing a framework to govern cooperation including in relation to exchanging information, coordinating investigations, training personnel, discussing regulatory expectations and economic analyses.

Part of a Broader Trend of U.S.-UK Collaboration

The MoU represents a significant step within a broader shift toward increased collaboration between the U.S. and UK on sanctions adoption and enforcement. Several key developments exemplify this trend:

  1. OFAC-OFSI Partnership: The MoU formalizes the growing partnership between OFAC and OFSI, which has been developing through initiatives such as the deployment of OFAC secondees to OFSI and the establishment of regular communication channels.
  2. Joint Guidance: U.S. and UK authorities have increasingly worked together to issue joint guidance (such as this Humanitarian Assistance and Food Security guidance note), streamlining compliance expectations and providing unified directions to stakeholders.
  3. Coordinated Sanctions Adoption: Both countries have increasingly aligned their sanctions measures, particularly in response to geopolitical crises such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions have been adopted not only bilaterally but also in coordination with allies through forums such as the G7, the Five Eyes community and in collaboration with the EU, signaling a commitment to unified enforcement. By way of recent example, last week, OFAC and OFSI jointly designated two Russian energy companies, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas.

The UK Sanctions Regime’s Shift Toward a U.S.-Style Framework

The MoU has emerged in the context of a broader transformation of the UK sanctions regime, which has gradually been evolving to align with the U.S. regime. Key examples of this shift include:

  1. Civil Strict Liability Powers: As reported previously, the UK has introduced civil strict liability enforcement powers for OFSI and the newly established Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI). Absent from the UK sanctions regime prior to Brexit, these powers bring the UK’s sanctions regime closer in line with the U.S. strict liability approach to sanctions enforcement, without a requirement to prove intent or negligence.
  2. Increased Use of General Licenses: The UK has significantly expanded its use of General Licenses, a tool that mirrors OFAC’s approach and provides flexibility in sanctions implementation by permitting UK sanctions authorities to adopt general exemptions for specific activities otherwise prohibited under sanctions laws.
  3. Post-Brexit Autonomy: Following the UK’s exit from the EU, the UK has sought to collaborate with other allies and partners with the intention of pooling expertise, sharing and developing ideas, and extending collective reach to maximize the impact of sanctions and to address loopholes. The UK’s collaboration in this regard with the U.S. (and its approach in general, as referenced in the UK government’s policy paper on the UK sanctions strategy published in February 2024) has spanned sanctions strategy, design, implementation and enforcement, and has also sought to prevent circumvention.

Implications

The MoU between OFAC and OFSI marks a significant turning point in the enforcement of sanctions, underscoring growing alignment between U.S. and UK authorities. At its core, the MoU enhances the ability of the U.S. and the UK to collaborate on key areas such as information sharing, joint investigations, and regulatory alignment. This increased coordination means that businesses must prepare for greater scrutiny and the possibility of facing enforcement actions simultaneously in both jurisdictions.

For companies, the impact of this cooperation extends beyond compliance obligations. Internal controls and monitoring systems must be robust enough to withstand the enhanced scrutiny that comes with shared intelligence and enforcement efforts between regulators. Compliance programs should be harmonized to address both U.S. and UK requirements so as to reduce the risk of oversight in a rapidly converging regulatory environment.

 

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On December 16, 2024, the EU issued its 15th package of sanctions against Russia, new designations under the Belarus sanctions regime, and the first designations under the hybrid threats sanctions regime adopted in October 2024. These updates are summarized below.

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Colleagues Nancy A. FischerMatthew R. RabinowitzZachary C. RozenSamantha FranksErin Kwiatkowski and Marcus Burden recently broke down the key points of a U.S. Department of the Treasury Final Rule that establishes significant new parameters for U.S. outbound investments in sensitive technologies within countries of concern.
TAKEAWAYS

Click here to read the full client alert.

 

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On September 23, 2024, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released for public inspection a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that seeks to prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles (CVs) with certain hardware and software that have a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia. If the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) hardware and the VCS and Automated Driving System (ADS) software are designed, developed, manufactured or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC or Russia, the transactions outlined below would be prohibited.

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On September 12, 2024, the UK government published the Trade, Aircraft and Shipping Sanctions (Civil Enforcement) Regulations 2024 (the “Regulations”), granting the UK’s trade sanctions enforcement body, the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI), new implementation and enforcement powers effective from 10 October 2024. The Regulations also grant the Department for Transport (DfT) corresponding powers in relation to aircraft and shipping sanctions (i.e., sanctions relating to the movement, registration and ownership of aircrafts and ships).

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On September 13, 2024 USTR announced modifications to the tariffs originally imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to pressure China to eliminate unreasonable policies and practices related to technology transfer and intellectual property protection. The changes reflect a comprehensive review of the duties required by statute.

USTR’s announcement follows its May 14, 2024 report on the four-year anniversary review of the Section 301 tariffs. The May 14, 2024, report stated that USTR would continue existing Section 301 tariffs on most products and proposed new or increased tariffs on products in certain strategic sectors, including lithium-ion batteries, lead acid battery parts, electric vehicles, critical minerals, permanent magnets, semiconductors, solar cells, ship-to-shore cranes, steel and aluminum and medical and personal protective equipment. USTR proposed granting certain limited exclusions for solar manufacturing equipment and for machinery used in domestic manufacturing.

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